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Five Takes on District of Columbia v. Heller
BRANNON P. DENNING * & GLENN H. REYNOLDS **
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to say much definitive about the impact of a recent Supreme
Court decision because, as we’ve pointed out elsewhere, the reach of a case
depends on lots of actors who often have tremendous discretion and little
effective oversight when it comes to implementation. 1 District of Columbia
v. Heller 2 is undoubtedly a landmark opinion by anyone’s definition, and
while it remains to be seen whether its effects match the hype surrounding its
announcement, there are a number of aspects of the decision that strike us as
worthy of comment. In this Essay, we offer five takes on portions of the
opinion or its implications that struck us as interesting. 3
First, we argue that Heller essentially followed the prevailing national
consensus on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Second, we argue that
this fact furnishes an important data point for those who argue that the Court
usually follows, rather than leads, public opinion on disputed matters; and
that, when it invalidates laws, it does so with respect to policy outliers. Third,
we speculate on what has already opened up as the second front in gun rights
litigation strategy: the incorporation of the Second Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fourth, we discuss how lower courts will likely treat
Heller—will they apply it or, as has happened with other “landmark”
Supreme Court cases, ignore it? Finally, we discuss the notable incongruities
among the Justices that Heller produced.

II. TAKE ONE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POPULIST
UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Just before the Court decided to grant certiorari in Heller, one of us
(Denning) argued at a conference on the Second Amendment that the Court
* Professor and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland School of Law,
Samford University.
** Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of
Tennessee. The authors thank Marc Spindelman for the kind invitation, and the editorial
staff of the Ohio State Law Journal, especially Dylan Griffiths for her patience.
1 See generally Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the
Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 406 (2008); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P.
Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court Held a
Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369.
2 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
3 See also Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought?
Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915 (2005).
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ought not take the case, because the right to keep and bear arms found fairly
robust protection in the legislative and executive branches at both the federal
and—with notable exceptions—state and local levels. 4 Borrowing Mark
Tushnet’s concept of the thin constitution that produced populist
constitutional law, Denning argued that the Second Amendment was
“thin”—the Amendment was not only not enforced in the courts, it was
treated with some hostility by federal judges—and its contours had been
shaped by public opinion outside the judiciary. 5
Specifically, he noted that most Americans believed that the Second
Amendment guaranteed an individual right to private gun ownership while
also regarding that right as subject to reasonable governmental regulations. 6
When one considered that the gun control debate was as much about culture
as it was about constitutional law, and given the Court’s dubious ability to
settle such fundamental disagreements, the case for denying certiorari and
permitting these disagreements to play out in the political arena was fairly
strong. 7
Alas, the Court once again ignored sound advice and granted certiorari
despite Denning’s powerful case. In a triumph of hope over experience, the
article, as published, suggested that the Court ought to write its opinion in a
way that tracked populist constitutional law, rather than try to change it. 8
Thus, he argued, the Court should at least endorse the individual right

4 See Brannon P. Denning, In Defense of a “Thin” Second Amendment: Culture, the

Constitution, and the Gun Control Debate, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 419 (2008).
5 Id. at 425–30.
6 Id. at 426–28; see also MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE
CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 127–28 (2007) (discussing public
opinion); Jeffrey Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP,
Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-Believes-Americans-RightOwn-Guns.aspx (reporting that “[a] solid majority of the U.S. public, 73%, believes the
Second Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the rights of Americans to own
guns.”)..
7 Denning, supra note 4, at 430–33. Dan Kahan and Don Braman have written
extensively about culture and the debate over gun control. See, e.g., Donald Braman &
Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of
Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569 (2006); Dan M.
Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of GunRisk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003). For an extensive critique of the
Court’s tendency to seek constitutional settlement of contentious issues, see LOUIS
MICHAEL SIEDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991) (arguing that few constitutional
questions ever stayed settled in the Court).
8 Denning, supra note 4, at 434–38.
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reading of the Second Amendment and do so in more than a merely symbolic
way. 9
Heller did precisely this. The first thing to note about Heller then, is the
remarkable degree to which all the opinions in the case—even those of the
dissenting Justices—took account of the thin Second Amendment. 10
Because it attracted relatively little comment, it is worth emphasizing at
the outset that in Heller the Court unanimously interred the old “collective”
right interpretation of the Second Amendment, which read the right to keep
and bear arms as guaranteeing only a state’s right to maintain and arm a
militia free from some federal control. 11 Justice Stevens, for example, begins
his opinion rejecting the “collective” versus “individual” rights dichotomy,
writing that the Second Amendment “[s]urely . . . protects a right that can be
enforced by individuals” and switching the debate to one over “the scope of
that right.” 12 Justice Breyer seemed willing to go a little further, recognizing
that the Amendment—in part—was intended “to help assure citizens that
they would have arms available for purposes of self-defense.” 13
On this point at least, Heller represented a welcome advance in the
debate—at least to anyone who slogged through the academic equivalent of
trench warfare between individualists and collectivists that played out in law
review articles during the 1990s.
The locus of disagreement in Heller was the scope of the individual
right. Here there was still plenty of room for disagreement. On this point, the
majority, rather than the dissent, tended to track public opinion in concluding
that the Second Amendment was not intended to guarantee the right to keep
9 Id. at 434, 436–39.
10 Denning, alas, can’t take credit for persuading the Court—his article was

published after the Court released its opinion.
11 See generally Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in
the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5
(1989). For a critique of the collective right theory that notes the unintended
consequences of taking it seriously, see Glenn H. Reynolds & Don B. Kates, Jr., The
Second Amendment and States’ Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1737 (1995).
12 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens goes on to argue that the scope does not include the right to
private ownership of arms for nonmilitary purposes. Id. (“Neither the text of the
Amendment nor the arguments advanced by its proponents evidenced the slightest
interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian uses of
firearms.”). See also id. at 2848 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing as one of “four
propositions . . . to which I believe the entire Court subscribes: (1) The Amendment
protects an ‘individual’ right—i.e., one that is separately possessed, and may be
separately enforced, by each person on whom it is conferred”).
13 Id. at 2847.
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and bear arms in a military context only; rather, it “guarantee[d] the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 14
Moreover, though the majority didn’t articulate the standard of review it
employed in detail—an omission that garnered criticism from Justice
Breyer 15 —it is clear from the fact that it affirmed the D.C. Circuit that some
sort of heightened standard of review was used. In a footnote, for example,
Justice Scalia argued that a rational basis test was not appropriate for
ascertaining “the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double
jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.” 16 That the
Court was unwilling to defer to elected officials relying on contested
empirical studies about gun control and gun crime, 17 strongly suggested that
the majority considered categorical bans on common weapons used for selfdefense to be presumptively unconstitutional. As Justice Scalia wrote, “the
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices
off the table,” including “the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used
for self-defense in the home.” 18
The majority’s robust reading of the Amendment’s individual right
stands in contrast to either Justice Stevens’s or Justice Breyer’s much
narrower conception. Justice Stevens devoted nearly all of his opinion to
sketching an alternative historical account of the Amendment’s origin and
scope. In the end, though, it is unclear what work his conclusion—that the
right can be exercised only in connection with military services—would do
in most cases.
By adopting a pragmatic, “interest-balancing” approach, 19 Justice Breyer
conceded at least the possibility that some gun control measures might
unduly interfere with the assumed right to have some weapons available for

14 Id. at 2797 (majority opinion); TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 128 (noting that only

20% of those polled thought the Second Amendment was primarily about maintaining a
militia as opposed to individual self-defense).
15 128 S. Ct. at 2868–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the lack of transparency
on the part of the majority). We discuss Justice Breyer’s approach infra notes 108–14 and
accompanying text.
16 Id. at 2817 n.27 (majority opinion).
17 Id. at 2854–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer summarizes the data, and
concludes that the “set of studies and counterstudies . . . could leave a judge uncertain
about the proper policy conclusion” and that “legislators, not judges, have primary
responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact.”).
18 Id. at 2822 (majority opinion).
19 See id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the interest-balancing
approach).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1339578

2008]

FIVE TAKES ON HELLER

675

some self-defense. 20 One suspects—though perhaps this is unfair to Justice
Breyer—that he would be unlikely to find constitutional fault with many (if
any) gun control regimes that made their way before him. 21 We consider
both dissents in more detail below. 22
The popular perception of rights is that they are trumps against assertions
of governmental authority. 23 Rights embodied in the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights represent, in the popular mind, commitments that, to
paraphrase Justice Scalia, place certain policy choices beyond the discretion
of government. 24 The problem with Justice Stevens’s dissent is that it seems
to define Second Amendment rights to comprise a null set, or very nearly so.
Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach, on the other hand, simply
frames firearms regulation as a weighing of competing interests. No longer a
trump, the individual’s right to keep and bear arms gains no special purchase
against various claims of the necessity to regulate firearms for the public
good.
Unlike, say, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against takings except for
public use, where what constitutes a valid public use is left to the political
process, 25 the Heller majority both articulates a right, then gives it some bite.
We think that this is consistent with what citizens expect of rights
generally—that they are judicially enforceable against government actors—
and of a right to keep and bear arms specifically.
But Heller also tracks populist constitutional law on the issue of
reasonable regulation. 26 Toward the end of the opinion, Justice Scalia listed
several “presumptively lawful regulatory measures”:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
20 Id. at 2865–67 (discussing D.C.’s law in context of its urban setting).
21 Breyer’s Heller dissent here seems to be the mirror image of what Lucas A.

“Scot” Powe described as the “classic [William] Brennan approach to deciding cases”:
He always acknowledged the legitimacy of the government’s interest; therefore . . .
he never took the government head on. But having recognized the legitimacy of
what government wanted to do, Brennan would then shift to conclude government
had not done it appropriately in the case at bar. That always left open the possibility
that, with added thought and effort, government could get it right.

LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 117 (2000).
22 See infra Part VI.
23 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977)
(discussing rights in these terms).
24 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25 Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
26 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms. 27

While, as Justice Breyer noted, Justice Scalia made no attempt to square
these categorical exclusions with the majority’s apparent heightened scrutiny
of D.C.’s handgun ban, 28 categorically excluding certain activities from
constitutional protection is not exactly unknown in constitutional law. For
example, despite prescribing strict scrutiny for content-based speech
regulations, 29 the Court excludes certain speech from First Amendment
protection altogether on the basis of its content. 30

III. TAKE TWO: HELLER AND THE COURT AS POLITICAL INSTITUTION
To our claim that Heller tracks popular opinion regarding the meaning of
the Second Amendment, one might respond, “So what?” In this Part, we
offer a couple of responses. First, that the Court’s decision was in line with
popular (and much elite) opinion furnishes another example of the Court
following, rather than leading, public opinion on divisive issues when it
exercises judicial review. Further, it offers an example of the Court
exercising judicial review to police outliers from the national consensus.
Normatively, these facts suggest that the complaints that Heller was
countermajoritarian, or an example of conservative judicial activism, are
overblown.

27 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17, 2817 n.26.
28 Id. at 2869–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am . . . puzzled by the majority’s list . . .

of provisions that in its view would survive Second Amendment scrutiny.”).
29 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (2d ed. 2003)
(“Government regulations linked to the content of speech receive severe judicial
scrutiny.”).
30 Id. at 14 (“Historically, some kinds of speech were considered to be simply
outside the scope of the First Amendment. . . . The list of unprotected speech included
incitements to violence, libel, obscenity, fighting words, and commercial advertising.”).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), inaugurated categorization in the
Court’s First Amendment doctrine. A recent example of this technique can be found in
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (creating an exclusion from protected
student speech for “expression . . . promoting illegal drug use”). For a critique of
categorization, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 12 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 1941–1953, at 162–64 (2006). The technique is used outside the First
Amendment as well. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007) (excluding discrimination in favor of “public
entities” from strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
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Michael Klarman has questioned what he terms the “heroic
countermajoritarian function”—the myth that the Court stands ready to
vindicate the rights of minority groups against legislative restrictions by
overweening majorities. 31 The reality, he argues, is that the Court more often
“takes a strong national consensus and imposes it on relatively isolated
outliers.” 32 Lucas Powe arrived at a similar conclusion about the Warren
Court, arguing that it imposed the values of a dominant national coalition on
the South and on urban Roman Catholic majorities. 33
The Court’s Heller opinion easily fits this narrative. There is strong—
one might say overwhelming—national support among both the public and
among many elites 34 for a right to keep and bear arms robust enough to
foreclose certain (but not all) gun control policies. While the Court will
sometimes ignore popular opinion, and sometimes will ignore elite opinion,
it rarely ignores both. The District’s ban, moreover, was one of the strictest
gun control regimes in the country. It was, in other words, an outlier, and ripe
for judicial intervention. Viewed from this national perspective, then, claims
that Heller was somehow activist or countermajoritarian are overstated. 35
31 Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
32 Id. at 6; see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 453 (2004) (“More
constitutional law than is commonly supposed reflects this tendency to constitutionalize
consensus and suppress outliers.”); id. at 454 (“Constitutional law much more frequently
involves the Court suppressing outliers than rescuing powerless minorities from
majoritarian oppression.”).
33 POWE, supra note 21, at 493–94 (arguing that the Court “could be better seen as
attacking (rather than protecting) them on a national (rather than a local) scale: the white
South, the pre-Vatican II Catholic hierarchy, rural legislators, the local criminal justice
system, and those remaining few who believed domestic communists were a threat to the
nation”).
34 Legislative and congressional support for a robust right to keep and bear arms is
described in Denning, supra note 4, at 427–28. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Second
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (noting
how Heller corresponded with public and elite opinion).
35 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court Gun Fight: A Case of
Conservative Activism, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2008, at A27 (“In striking down the law,
Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion, joined by the court's four other most
conservative justices, is quite activist in pursuing the conservative political agenda of
protecting gun owners.”); Douglas W. Kmiec, Guns and the Supreme Court: Dead
Wrong, TIDINGS ONLINE, July 11, 2008, http://www.the-tidings.com/2008/071108/
kmiec.htm (“[W]hen Justice Scalia and four other members of the Court decided D.C. v.
Heller, they nullified D.C.'s gun law and cast doubt upon the laws of every state. From
their high bench on that morning, it would not be the democratic choice that mattered, but
theirs. Constitutional text, history, and precedent all set aside.”).
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Heller is of a piece with cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, 36 Lawrence v.
Texas, 37 and Grutter v. Bollinger, 38 to name just a few cases in which the
Court either followed public opinion, forced it on outliers, or both. 39
Given that the political branches were pretty adept at enforcing the
Amendment outside the courts, why did the Court take Heller? A denial of
certiorari would have produced much the same effect as the Court’s decision
to intervene—D.C.’s outlier policy would have remained invalidated. It was
not as if gun control generally, or gun control in D.C., was a political hot
potato that other branches of government were eager for the Supreme Court
to settle. 40
The answer here, we think, lies in the Court’s drift away from shared
constitutional interpretation and its embrace of judicial supremacy. Simply
put, the Court’s members—liberal and conservative—feel little if any
consistent compunction to defer to other branches of government when it
comes to constitutional interpretation. 41 Sure the right to keep and bear arms
had been enforced, after a fashion, through ordinary politics, but the Court’s
attitude of late seems to be that nothing can be considered to be a “real” right
until the Court says that it is.

36 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut prohibition on use of
contraceptives); Klarman, supra note 31, at 10 (“Griswold is best understood as the Court
constitutionalizing a dominant national consensus and using it to suppress a local
outlier.”). See also Sunstein, supra note 34 (comparing the two cases).
37 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy).
38 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding Michigan Law School’s affirmative action
admissions policy); Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
347, 347 (2003) (observing that “rather than join forces with the politically isolated
opponents of affirmative action, the Court issued a ruling that conformed to social and
political forces”).
39 For other examples, see Klarman, supra note 31, at 16–18.
40 See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference
to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993) (“Historically, the justices have
most often exercised their power to declare state and federal practices unconstitutional
only when the dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some public
dispute. [In such cases,] prominent elected officials consciously invite the judiciary to
resolve those political controversies that they cannot or would rather not address.”).
41 To be sure, members of the Court frequently urge deference to other branches
when they conclude the other branches’ constitutional interpretation reflect their own. As
Cass Sunstein notes, “Almost no one is a universal Thayerian.” Sunstein, supra note 34,
manuscript at 13 (footnote omitted). The reference is to James Bradley Thayer, whose
article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129 (1893) is the ur-text of judicial restraint. Thayer advocated that courts defer
to coordinate branches of the federal government absent evidence of a “clear mistake” in
the interpretation of the Constitution.
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This being an election year, however, we cannot help but add the
following observation: Heller potentially helped Democrats this year and will
continue to do so in future elections, by taking the contentious issue of gun
control off the table. Much as Roe v. Wade 42 has aided Republicans, enabling
them to run against abortion and the Court without any real obligation to
fashion a positive abortion policy, Democrats—at least those from safely
anti-gun districts—can lament Heller and criticize the Court while using the
decision as cover. Such insulation is no doubt welcome, as conventional
wisdom among Democrats holds that the gun issue lost them elections in
1994, 2000, and 2004. On this issue at least, Barack Obama is probably more
than a little grateful for the Court’s penchant for judicial supremacy these
days.

IV. TAKE THREE: HELLER, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, AND
INCORPORATION
Within hours of Heller’s announcement, lawyers filed suits challenging
other local gun control laws that were as restrictive as D.C.’s. Of course,
because the Second Amendment has yet to be formally incorporated through
the Fourteenth Amendment against the states, 43 these suits will likely fail
initially. The million dollar question, however, is whether the Court, having
taken the initial plunge, will accept one or more cases and address the
incorporation issue. If it does, then, as Justice Stevens fretted, “the District’s
policy choice may well be just the first of an unknown number of dominoes
to be knocked off the table.” 44 If not, Heller’s impact is likely to be largely
symbolic, because few federal gun laws are vulnerable under Heller.

A. Incorporation: A Primer
Until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts had little
role as guarantor of individual liberties against violations by state or local
officials. 45 Even after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the Court
expressed reluctance to read its provisions expansively. In the infamous
Slaughter-House Cases, for example, the Court read the Fourteenth
Amendment’s provisions narrowly—so narrowly, in fact, that it all but read

42 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
44 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2846 (2008) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
45 See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill
of Rights applies only to federal government).
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Amendment altogether. 46 But
by 1945, as William Wiecek has written, “the definition and protection of
liberty had become the responsibility of the national government and its
courts.” 47 The Fourteenth Amendment, moreover, was the vehicle for this
transfer of responsibility.
This transformation occurred gradually; in the late nineteenth century,
the Court began to apply portions of the Bill of Rights to the states. In this
era of property rights protection, the first incorporated provision was,
fittingly, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 48 A few years later, in
Twining v. New Jersey, the Court affirmed that some provisions of the Bill of
Rights might be applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
but refused to hold that all were. 49 Only those that were “fundamental” such
that denial of them would be denial of “due process of law” would apply to
states. 50
Twining’s formulation was picked up and endorsed by Justice Cardozo in
Palko v. Connecticut, 51 and “canonized” by Justice Frankfurter in the
incorporation debates that roiled the Court in the late 1940s. 52 In 1968, the
Court restated the test for selective incorporation in Duncan v. Louisiana 53 as
“whether a right is among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,’ . . . [or]
whether it is ‘basic in our system of jurisprudence’. . . .” 54 Is it, in other
words, “fundamental to the American scheme of justice?” 55 Duncan’s
formulation remains the test for incorporation today.
46 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873); see also Kevin C. Newsom, Setting
Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE
L.J. 643, 646 (2000).
47 WIECEK, supra note 30, at 464–65.
48 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
49 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
50 Id. at 101, 106. It would not be frivolous to argue that if the Framers put it in the
Bill of Rights, then that right must be fundamental by definition. But that’s not how the
Court has tended to approach the question. The Court has made clear that simply because
it is enumerated in the Bill of Rights, a right is not, ipso facto, fundamental.
51 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
52 WIECEK, supra note 30, at 473; Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963). The incorporation debates within the
Vinson Court is well-told in WIECEK, supra note 30, at 464–532.
53 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
54 Id. at 148–49 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
55 Id. at 149.
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B. Incorporating the Second Amendment
Earlier, substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights more analogous to
the Second Amendment, like the various provisions of the First Amendment,
were incorporated largely ipse dixit. The Court simply declared—with no
real analysis—that various provisions were fundamental and applied to the
states. 56 Duncan, and modern selective incorporation in general, was
developed during the mid-1960s, when the Court was focused on creating
minimum national standards for criminal procedure. 57 Assuming that the
Court would not simply declare the Second Amendment to be fundamental,
and incorporate it through the Due Process Clause, what criteria would it use
to determine fundamental-ness using the Duncan test? Duncan itself is not
explicit, but the inquiry seems to be an historical one. 58
Not surprisingly, the answer depends on how one interprets history and
one’s criteria for fundamental-ness. For example, the leading contemporary
historian of Reconstruction concluded that whatever else the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended, “it is abundantly clear that Republicans
56 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The broad meaning
given the Amendment by . . . earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its decisions
concerning an individual's religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment
was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging
religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application and broad
interpretation to the ‘establishment of religion’ clause.”) (footnote omitted); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the right to free exercise: “The
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937) (incorporating assembly and petition rights: “Freedom of speech and of the press
are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. . . . The right of peaceable assembly is a right
cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental. . . . The First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against
abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere.
For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions—principles
which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process
clause.”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (incorporating free press: “It is no
longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by
state action.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating free
speech: “For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties' protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
57 POWE, supra note 21, at 379–444.
58 391 U.S. at 151–52 (reviewing the history of the Anglo-American jury trial).
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wished to give constitutional sanction to states’ obligations to respect such
key provisions as freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, trial by impartial
jury, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment and unreasonable
search and seizure.” 59
On the other hand, a recent study by Steve Calabresi and Sarah Agudo
concludes that the question is a much closer one. 60 According to their survey
of state constitutional provisions circa 1868, which they regard as proxies for
fundamental rights, they found that twenty-two state constitutions protected
the right to keep and bear arms. 61 This represents a majority of states, but not
the three-quarters threshold they set for regarding a particular right as
fundamental. 62 They do note, however, that the right was protected by the
states in which 61% of the population lived in 1868. 63
If the Court takes up the issue of incorporation, and applies the Duncan
standard, the opinions would likely end up rehashing the historical debate
engaged in by the majority and the dissenters. Members of the Heller
majority would emphasize the roots of the right, its importance to the
Framers, their placement of it in the Bill of Rights, and subsequent imitation
in state constitutions, 64 as well, perhaps, as stressing the views of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers. The dissenters, on the other hand, would
probably rely heavily on the degree of regulation at common law mentioned
by Justice Breyer. 65 Whose history one accepts will, we think, largely turn
on whether one supports or rejects incorporation. In the next section, we
discuss alternatives to Duncan’s incorporation formula and the dual historical
narratives it would likely produce.

59 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, at 258 (1988); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 257–66 (1998) (recounting Reconstruction-era discussions of the right
to keep and bear arms).
60 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1114940.
61 Id., manuscript at 45.
62 Id., manuscript at 11 (defining “rights . . . especially deeply rooted in history and
tradition” as those embodied in three-quarters of existing states’ constitutions because
“three-quarters is the number of states that Article V sets as the threshold consensus
necessary for the making of federal constitutional law” and noting that “[a]rguably, rights
protected by less than three-quarters of the states in 1868 were not deemed fundamental
and are not deeply rooted in history and tradition”).
63 Id., manuscript at 46.
64 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–2813 (2008).
65 Id. at 2848–50, 2866–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Yet, it is not self-evident why the question ought to be framed as what
rights were in state constitutions in 1868. While history is part of Duncan’s
inquiry, the inquiry is not exhausted by it. If, as it does in other doctrinal
areas, 66 the Court were to consider the presence or absence of a national
consensus as relevant to the question of whether a fundamental right exists,
the case for incorporation is pretty clear. If one looks to state practice after
1868—indeed, looking to state practice over the last two or three decades—
one sees not only states explicitly protecting individual rights to private gun
ownership in their state constitutions, but also revising their laws to permit
concealed carry of those arms.
A study by Eugene Volokh shows that, since 1970, eighteen states have
added right to keep and bear arms provisions to their constitutions, or
amended existing provisions to make explicit the individual nature of the
right. 67 Only eight states either lack a Second Amendment analogue in their
state constitution or have interpreted the existing provisions to guarantee
only a “collective” right. 68 Forty states, by contrast, either expressly or
through judicial interpretation have embraced a private right to own firearms
for individual self-defense. 69 Further, within the last decade, states have
moved from a discretionary concealed-carry licensing regime to one in which
licenses to carry a concealed weapon must be issued if the applicant meets
the statutory requirements. Today, nearly two-thirds of the states have “shallissue” licensing regimes. 70
66 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649–50 (2008) (assessing

validity of punishments under the Eighth Amendment according to currently prevailing
standards as reflected in legislative enactments and state practice); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that in substantive
due process cases, “a court is bound to confine the values that it recognizes to those truly
deserving constitutional stature, either to those expressed in constitutional text, or those
exemplified by ‘the traditions from which [the Nation] developed,’ or revealed by
contrast with ‘the traditions from which it broke.’” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
67 Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 191, 214–17 (2006) (listing the states).
68 Id. at 205. The states lacking any guarantee are California, Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey and New York. Kansas and Massachusetts courts have rejected
an individual right reading of their state constitution’s right to keep and bear arms
provision. Id.
69 Id.
70 See Clayton Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of
Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 685 (1995); Steven W. Kranz,
Comment, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small Changes Help
Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 639, 647 (2006) (claiming that the
percentage of states classified as “shall-issue” states increased from fifteen to seventytwo percent in eighteen years).
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Given the current state of affairs, it seems that most (though certainly not
all) state legislatures regard a private right to keep and bear arms as a
necessary part of liberty. If this doesn’t meet Duncan’s standard of
“necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty,” 71 then that
likely says more about the inadequacy of the standard than it does about the
strength of the evidence on the fundamental-ness of gun rights in the United
States. In fact, Lucas Powe has speculated, correctly in our view, that the
entire project of selective incorporation was driven in part by the fact that
total incorporation would have required the Court to apply to the states
certain provisions of the Bill of Rights “that the justices probably did not
like,” including the Second Amendment. 72

Comment [BPD1]: Y’all changed “Scot” to
“Lucas” at TAN 33, so I changed it here to be
consistent.

C. Alternatives to the Selective Incorporation Paradigm
There are, however, some intriguing alternatives to Duncan’s rather
unhelpful restatement of the fundamental/ordered liberty test. Specifically,
the Second Amendment might also furnish a vehicle for resuscitation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, which the Slaughter-House Cases rendered
moribund. First, though, we consider a quite different alternative—not
incorporating the Second Amendment.

1. Don’t Incorporate
Federalism is good, we are told, because it permits experimentation and
promotes competition among subnational units. Decentralization permits
regulatory regimes to be tailored to local wants and needs. As long as
members of subnational communities have meaningful voice and exit
options, then individuals can shop around to find state and local governments
to which they are suited.
If these things are true—and given the salient cultural dimension to the
controversy over the right to keep and bear arms—then there are good
reasons, maybe even good conservative reasons, for not incorporating it.
According to Steve Calabresi and Sarah Agudo, these cultural differences
71 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1967). For another argument that
the Second Amendment meets this standard, and that lower courts could so hold on their
own, see Nelson Lund, Anticipating the Second Amendment Incorporation: The Role of
the Inferior Courts, SYRACUSE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), manuscript at 14–15,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1239422.
72 POWE, supra note 21, at 415. “The Court’s doctrine of ‘selective incorporation’,”
by contrast, “meant they could be left out even though they are part of the Bill of Rights
and equally as well protected by state law as criminal juries or double jeopardy.
Furthermore, given the Court’s ability to control the cases it hears, those provisions could
be left out without the Court’s ever having to justify their exclusion.” Id.
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manifested themselves as early as the nineteenth century, with southern
states’ constitutions more likely to contain strong right to keep and bear arms
provisions than those in other states. 73
The incorporation question potentially puts Court conservatives in a
bind, since they often favor decentralization and policy competition in other
areas of the law. 74 Justice Thomas, for example, has argued for a return to
the original understanding of the Establishment Clause: prohibition on
federal establishment, but not necessarily establishment of religion by
states. 75 And critics of the Warren Court’s standardization of criminal
procedures, like Justice Harlan, argued that a one-size-fits-all approach
ignored important regional and local variations that ought to be respected in
the name of federalism. 76
One could easily deploy similar arguments against incorporation of the
Second Amendment. Why should New Yorkers or Chicagoans, many if not
most of whom are strong supporters of strict gun control, be forced to adopt a
regulatory regime that potentially puts more guns in private hands than
current laws allow? Given adequate exit options for dissenters, couldn’t those
citizens be permitted to entrust their personal security to the police, rather
than engaging in self help? States for which the right to keep and bear arms is
important have tended to include the right in their constitutions, or amended
their constitutions to include it. 77 State courts have enforced those
provisions, permitting some regulations, striking down others; so, why not
permit such decisions to be made on a state-by-state basis? 78 Or if
standardization is required, why not allow Congress to do it, after adequate

73 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 60, manuscript at 45.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580–83 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (noting that the Gun Free School Zones Act preempted similar state laws).
75 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly
suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering
with state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which does protect an
individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the Establishment Clause.”).
76 POWE, supra note 21, at 396–97, 403, 414, 422, 427, 441 (describing Justice
Harlan’s dissents in many of the Warren Court criminal procedure cases); see also Walter
V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1956).
77 See generally Volokh, supra note 67.
78 See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683,
687 (2007) (discussing state court enforcement of state right to keep and bear arms
provisions).
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deliberation by a national legislative body, by exercising its enforcement
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? 79
We raise this merely to cover the range of possible ways to resolve the
incorporation conundrum. Application of the Bill of Rights to the states
through the Due Process Clause has always presented special problems to the
Court. Those problems remain—and are perhaps especially acute—when it
comes to the right to keep and bear arms, the exercise of which is perceived
to impose costs on governments and other citizens that might be considered
unique as compared to, say, those imposed by the First Amendment. These
difficulties cannot be wished away—especially by conservatives who have
criticized the incorporation of other rights. On the other hand, it is certainly
the case that similar arguments might support the non-incorporation of other
rights, say involving sexually-themed speech or criminal procedure, raising
the question of why the Second Amendment should be treated differently
only because it came before the Court later.

2. Use the Privileges or Immunities Clause
Assuming that a conservative majority of the Court decided to take the
plunge again and incorporate the Second Amendment, there is a way to avoid
the nebulous inquiry prescribed by the Court’s selective incorporation
doctrine. As every law student knows, the Court’s Slaughter-House Cases
rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause a constitutional dead letter soon
after ratification. And despite some recent stirrings, 80 the Court has shown
no inclination either to revisit the Slaughter-House Cases or to otherwise use
that clause as an alternative vehicle for incorporation. 81
Nevertheless, the Privileges or Immunities Clause has some attractive
features that would make it a particularly useful vehicle for incorporating the
Second Amendment. First, there is strong historical evidence that the right to
79 For a proposal, see Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an

“Underenforced Constitutional Norm,” 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 762 (1998).
80 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–04 (1999) (locating a “right to travel” in part
in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
81 Conventional wisdom holds that the Slaughter-House Cases would have to be
overruled for the Privileges or Immunities Clause to do any real work in constitutional
law, and that lower federal courts could not incorporate the Second Amendment through
the Privileges or Immunities Clause on their own. See Lund, supra note 71, manuscript at
9–10 (“The Supreme Court . . . has consistently assumed that incorporation of the
guarantees listed in the Bill of Rights may not proceed under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. The lower courts, it seems to me, are stuck with that result until the Supreme
Court changes course.”) But Kevin Newsom has argued to the contrary that nothing in
that opinion forecloses incorporating the Bill of Rights through the Clause. See Newsom,
supra note 46, at 733–36.
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keep and bear arms was very much on the minds of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framers. Dred Scott had invoked the right as a reductio ad
absurdum: if African-Americans were citizens, Chief Justice Taney noted,
then one of the privileges or immunities to which they were entitled was the
right to keep and bear arms. 82 The Framers understood that arms had been
denied to slaves during the antebellum period, and that many southern states
continued to deny freed slaves access to arms to defend themselves against
insurgent violence during Reconstruction. Thus many Framers specifically
mentioned the right to keep and bear arms when offering examples of
protected privileges or immunities. 83
There are other advantages as well. As Akhil Amar has written, using the
Privileges or Immunities Clause instead of the Due Process Clause allows the
Court to reframe the question. “Instead of asking whether a given provision
is fundamental,” he wrote, “we must ask whether it is a personal privilege—
that is, a private right—of individual citizens, rather than a right of states or
the public at large.” 84 In light of history and of Heller, the answer is obvious.
Heller held that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to
possess arms for private self-defense. It would be radically inconsistent to
maintain, despite Heller, the right recognized there did not fit the definition
of a “privilege or immunity” of citizens of the U.S.
Taking this route, though, would produce difficulties. First, a lot of water
has passed under the proverbial bridge since 1873. Reintegrating the
Privileges or Immunities Clause into the mainstream of American
constitutional law might be a difficult process. It’s possible much of the
Court would discount the utility of the clause heavily as against the uncertain
effects that might result from its use. Moreover, it is not clear what effects
incorporating the Second Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause would have on the gun rights of resident aliens. After all, the clause
speaks of protecting the privileges or immunities of “citizens of the United
States” against state interference. 85 It seems incongruous for there to be
protection for all individuals’ gun rights at the federal level, but only for U.S.
citizens at the state or local level—especially when resident aliens might live

82 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416–17 (1856) (arguing that if African-Americans were
considered citizens “and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens,” then “[i]t
would give persons of the negro race . . . the right to . . . keep and carry arms wherever
they went”).
83 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 59, at 186–93; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 43, 52, 53, 56,
140, 141, 164 (1986); FONER, supra note 59, at 258.
84 AMAR, supra note 59, at 221.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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in areas in which they most need guns for self-defense and where reliance on
the police for protection is the most problematic.
We feel fairly confident in predicting that the Court will take up an
incorporation case in the near future. When it does, it will be interesting to
see (1) whether any in the Heller majority express federalism-based qualms
about incorporation and (2) if the Court does incorporate it, how it does so.
Though it hardly matters, given the few constitutional rights left
unincorporated, the Second Amendment offers the Court the best opportunity
in over a generation to articulate a new test for incorporating federal rights
against the states. Whether the Court will seize it remains to be seen.

V. TAKE FOUR: HELLER AND THE LOWER COURTS—A CASE OF
INDIGESTION? 86
Even an unincorporated Second Amendment will have precious little
impact if lower courts refuse to implement it. While lower court resistance to
Supreme Court decisions does not fit the traditional law school narrative that
the Supreme Court decides and the lower courts dutifully implement its
decisions, such resistance is a real phenomenon. Pre-Heller case law, for
example, evinced a significant hostility toward the individual right argument,
and a surprisingly deep investment in lower courts’ own case law, despite its
rather tenuous anchor in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Miller. 87 Which raises the question: What will lower court judges do when
presented with gun rights cases post-Heller?
Elsewhere we have documented the lack of enthusiasm for the Court’s
attempt to impose limits on congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, 88 in cases like Lopez 89 and Morrison. 90 Here, we briefly summarize

86 This Part draws on, and expands, Reynolds & Denning, Heller’s Future in the
Lower Courts, supra note 1.
87 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For a discussion of what Miller held (and didn’t hold), see
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller‘s Tale: A Reply to David
Yassky, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (2002). For lower courts’ treatment of Miller
pre-Heller, see Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
961 (1996).
88 See Reynolds & Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, supra note 1; see also
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003)
(looking at lower court opinions following Morrison).
89 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
90 529 U.S. 598 (2000). One could cite examples of this from other doctrinal areas as
well. See Ilya Somin, Locked Liberties, LEGAL TIMES, July 28, 2008, at 42–43
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our earlier findings, then suggest that parallels exist between the Commerce
Clause and the Second Amendment that may result in post-Heller resistance
similar to that which we observed following Lopez and Morrison.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the “Gun Free School Zones
Act” as being in excess of Congress’s enumerated power to regulate
commerce among the several states. 91 Prior to Lopez, the conventional
wisdom was that Congress could do essentially anything it wanted under the
Commerce Clause, something that, as Deborah Merritt noted, had became a
law school joke by the 1980s. 92 Observing the lower courts’ response to this
change seemed likely to us to provide some insight into how lower courts
respond to Supreme Court doctrine generally.
And it did, though at first things were a bit unclear. The initial
installment of our project, published in the Wisconsin Law Review in 2000,
was subtitled What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution
and Nobody Came? 93 There, we concluded that lower courts seemed
strangely slow to respond to the Lopez decision, but suggested that Supreme
Court clarification might improve matters.
[The] Lopez decisions provide a background for two very different, though
not necessarily entirely inconsistent, stories. One story—not very flattering
to court of appeals judges—is that of an ossified intermediate bench in the
throes of “judicial sclerosis,” unable or unwilling to apply Supreme Court
decisions that depart too sharply from business as usual. This story seems
particularly compelling in the context of the drug and firearms cases, where
the courts' impatience with constitutional arguments that might keep
unpopular offenders out of jail is palpable, and where Lopez issues are
dismissed in terse paragraphs containing little or no analysis.
But there is another story, too; this one is not very flattering to the
Supreme Court. The view of appellate judging provided in most law school
classes is a fairly simple one: Higher courts select principles, which lower
courts then apply faithfully. As any lawyer with even a modicum of practice
experience can attest, the situation in the real world is more complex. For
example, that the lower courts are supposed to apply principles articulated
by higher courts presumes that the principles of the upper courts are easily
identifiable and readily available for application by the lower courts. But as
the multiplicity of readings to which Lopez has been subject suggests,
higher courts (in this case, the United States Supreme Court) do not always
(comparing Heller’s recognition of the right to keep and bear arms to the Court’s uneven
protection of property rights under the Takings Clause).
91 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
92 Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 691 (1995).
93 Reynolds & Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, supra note 1.
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fulfill this responsibility.
....
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck a bold and telling blow for limited
government and a return to the first principles of the Constitution. Or it
didn't. Or maybe it did, but it just did not say it very well. After all, it does
not matter how loudly you speak if you mumble when you do so.
How will we know which? The cynical—and, perhaps sadly, correct—
answer in this case is, we will know when the Supreme Court tells us.
Given the Court's decision this Term to resolve the split in the circuits over
the Violence Against Women Act occasioned by the Brzonkala decision, as
well as the scope of the federal arson statute, perhaps Supreme Court
resolution is not too far away. 94

Though the Supreme Court was probably unmoved by our pleas, it did
produce clear decisions in two subsequent cases, and in both it seemed to
underscore the importance of the Lopez decision in terms that seemed to
remove most excuses for lower court foot-dragging. 95
A couple of years later, we authored the next installment of our survey. 96
Once again, we found that lower courts were, in fact, doing little to put
Lopez's reasoning into effect. Examining the large number of lower court
cases addressing Commerce Clause issues, we found ample evidence of what
Judge Gilbert S. Merritt lamented, in a Yale Law Journal Essay, as an
increasing bureaucratization of the judiciary. 97 This bureaucratic mindset—
what one of us once heard William Van Alstyne refer to as a “desk-clearing
mentality” at work—is partially reflected in a increased concern with simply
disposing of cases, as opposed to disposing of cases correctly. We concluded:
But if ideology is not the source of lower court resistance—or, if any
sustained inquiry is likely to result in the old Scots verdict, "not proven"—is
there an explanation for lower courts' behavior? Research by other scholars
94 Id. at 397–400 (footnotes omitted).
95 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850–51 (2000) (holding that an owner-

occupied house was not “used in” interstate commerce for purposes of federal arson
statute); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (striking down, as
exceeding the scope of the commerce power, the civil-suit provision of the Violence
Against Women Act).
96 Denning & Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance, supra note 88. This summary of
our earlier work is drawn from Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Marbury’s Mixed Messages,
71 TENN. L. REV. 303 (2004).
97 Gilbert S. Merritt, Owen Fiss on Paradise Lost: The Judicial Bureaucracy in the
Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1469 (1983).
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suggests that the problem here, to paraphrase former presidential candidate
Michael Dukakis, is not ideology, but rather competence. What we are
seeing in lower courts' Commerce Clause decisions may be only
symptomatic of a larger problem in the federal judiciary: that of courts
responding to an increasingly unmanageable caseload by resorting to
corner-cutting, resulting in an overall reduction in the quality of courts'
work product. 98

What will happen with Heller’s progeny is unclear. Gun rights advocates
have already commenced litigation against gun control laws in several
jurisdictions, 99 and, of course, criminal defendants, for whom hope springs
eternal, have already begun adding Second Amendment claims to their
defenses, so far with little result. But while these defendants may well be
motivated more by hope than substance, the dismissive response of lower
courts bodes poorly for Heller’s reception in more serious cases.
For example, in United States v. Lewis, Chief Judge Curtis Gómez
dismissed a Second Amendment argument based on the pre-Heller caselaw
of the Second Circuit, entirely omitting any discussion of the Supreme
Court’s 9-0 rejection of the collective right theory underlying that
caselaw. 100 This drew criticism from Eugene Volokh, who wrote:
It may well be that the defendant didn't provide enough argument to
support his motion to dismiss. I'm also pretty sure that the courts will find
that the right to keep and bear arms isn't substantially burdened by the ban
on knowingly possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number; and
they may well uphold the Virgin Islands license requirement, or conclude
that only someone who has tried to get a license but been denied one is
entitled to challenge the requirement.
But the court's reliance on precedent strikes me as quite weak: Rybar
was decided by the Third Circuit on the theory that the Second Amendment
only protects gun possession when it has a "connection with militia-related
activity." Heller rejects that theory, which means that Rybar and Willaman
are no longer good law. . . .
So I don't think the district court was entitled to punt the matter to the
pre-Heller collective-rights precedent. It needed to do the Heller analysis
(or, if appropriate, decline to deal with the Second Amendment question, if
the litigant hadn't adequately argued it). And simply saying that under
98 Denning & Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance, supra note 88, at 1303.
99 See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Gun Advocates Armed for Legal Fight, L.A. TIMES, June

27, 2008, at A19.
100 United States v. Lewis, Criminal No. 2008-21, 2008 WL 2625633 (D.V.I., July
03, 2008).
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Heller the "right is not unfettered" isn't an adequate justification for the
court's decision, either: Obviously some fetters are permissible but others
aren't, so the question is why these particular gun controls are justified
given the Heller reasoning. 101

The Lewis opinion, in fact, is only three double-spaced pages long, of
which only one paragraph contains any substantive reasoning; this
combination of superficiality and hostility is, alas, typical of pre-Heller lower
court caselaw, and—so far at least—of much post-Heller caselaw as well. A
somewhat more substantive approach can be found in the case of Mullenix v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, in which Heller is actually quoted
and applied on the subject of Second Amendment protection for machine
guns. 102 Though the treatment is not extensive, it is fair to say that it is
adequate, especially in light of the defendants’ briefing.
Which approach will govern in future cases? Some are doubtful: Doug
Berman comments: “I expect that we will be seeing lots and lots of plausible
post-Heller Second Amendment claims brought by all sorts of litigants, and
lots and lots of (less plausible?) rejections of these claims by lower
courts.” 103 Berman may be right, but it seems likely that increased public
attention—at least when there are serious arguments at hand—is likely to
limit the impact of the desk-clearing mentality, certainly in the context of
challenges to gun control laws brought by activist groups. So will Heller
suffer Lopez’s fate, serving more as casebook fodder than as actual
authority? There are some reasons to think it might, and some reasons to
think it might not. On balance, it seems as if “might not” is likely to be the
winner.
On the “might” side, we have the institutional prejudices of the courts of
appeals, in favor of status quo and a desk-clearing mentality. Like the
bureaucrats they increasingly resemble, the appellate judiciary doesn’t like to
rock the boat. In addition, the courts of appeals have a history of more-or-less
open hostility to claims of a private right to arms. The vast majority of cases
suggest that, to the extent they can, they will try to rule against such a right.
Further, as was true in Lopez, the Heller Court sent somewhat mixed signals
regarding its commitment to its own decision. In Heller, for example, the
Court’s ambiguity regarding the standard of review that applies, along with

101 Eugene Volokh, District Court Wrongly Follows Pre-Heller “Collective Rights”

Circuit Precedent, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, July 8, 2008, http://volokh.com/archives/
archive_2008_07_06-2008_07_12.shtml#1215558009.
102 No. 5:07-CV-145-D, 2008 WL 2620175, at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008).
103 Doug Berman, The Post-Heller Litigation Headaches (and Judicial Cut-Backs)
Have
Begun,
SENTENCING
LAW
AND
POLICY,
July
8,
2008,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/07/the-post-heller.html.
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the enumeration of presumptive constitutional firearms regulations, echoes
the equivocal signals in Lopez regarding how the factors used to evaluate
“substantial effects” on interstate commerce ought to be weighed or applied.
On the “might not” side, however, we have a very different situation
from that relating to the Commerce Clause following Lopez. There was
virtually no follow-up litigation to Lopez on the part of the public interest
bar; by contrast, several follow-up lawsuits were filed, challenging gun
control laws in other communities, within days of the Heller opinion’s
publication. 104 There was relatively little public interest in Lopez or the
Commerce Clause; the Second Amendment, on the other hand, is among the
most significant provisions of the Bill of Rights from the standpoint of public
engagement. 105
Which set of forces will prevail? It’s impossible to say for certain, but
bureaucrats tend to take the path of least resistance and least controversy.
Though some foot-dragging is likely, it’s also likely that the kind of
resistance demonstrated in response to Lopez won’t manifest itself in
response to Heller.
This is particularly true because, as noted above, the dissents in Heller,
while repudiating the collective right approach, fail to articulate any coherent
alternative theory. 106 With the collective right theory now unanimously
repudiated by the Court, and the absence of any coherent alternative
approach, the majority opinion in Heller is likely to produce more lower
court compliance than did Lopez.
Or, perhaps, we will publish another survey of lower court compliance
with Supreme Court decisions and conclude, once again, that the Supreme
Court has surprisingly little influence on what actually happens in America’s
judicial system. That would be a discovery with its own consequences,
beyond the focus of this brief Essay.

VI. TAKE FIVE: CONSTITUTIONAL COGNITIVE DISSONANCE—JUSTICE
STEVENS’S LITE BEER AND JUSTICE BREYER’S UNDUE BURDEN LITE
If the majority opinion in Heller can be characterized as minimalist,
deciding no more than required for the resolution of the case at hand and
providing only limited guidance to lower courts in future cases, then the
dissents can be characterized as conflicted. Like the majority, they open by
recognizing that the Second Amendment creates an individual right of some
sort. Unlike the majority, however, they seem unable to imagine any

104 See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 99.
105 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
106 See infra notes 107–121 and accompanying text.
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circumstance—even the District of Columbia’s draconian gun ban—that
would cause that individual right to do any actual work.
Justice Stevens’s dissent opens clearly enough:
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second
Amendment protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.” Surely it
protects a right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us
anything about the scope of that right. 107

Unfortunately, neither does Justice Stevens’s dissent.
Indeed, Justice Stevens’s individual right view of the Second
Amendment can be compared to the treatment of beer in a television
commercial: you can talk about how delicious the beer is, show it in frosty
glasses with foam rolling down their sides, and otherwise extol its virtues.
What you are not allowed to do is to actually drink it. Likewise, Justice
Stevens’s individual right appears to be a rather watery brew: “The opinion
the Court announces today fails to identify any new evidence supporting the
view that the Amendment was intended to limit the power of Congress to
regulate civilian uses of weapons.” 108 His conclusion:
The Court would have us believe that over 200 years ago, the Framers made
a choice to limit the tools available to elected officials wishing to regulate
civilian uses of weapons, and to authorize this Court to use the common-law
process of case-by-case judicial lawmaking to define the contours of
acceptable gun control policy. Absent compelling evidence that is nowhere
to be found in the Court’s opinion, I could not possibly conclude that the
Framers made such a choice. 109

In Justice Stevens’s formulation, apparently, the Second Amendment
protects an individual right. It just doesn’t protect an individual right to own
guns if Congress, or the D.C. City Council, feels otherwise. Whether this
conception should be characterized as “tastes great” or “less filling” is a
question that will be left to the reader. It does raise questions about why,
exactly, Justice Stevens felt it important to declare at the outset that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right, given that, ordinarily, the
purpose of such rights under the Constitution is precisely to “limit the tools
available to elected officials” who wish to regulate the conduct that those
rights protect.
107 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
108 Id. at 2823.
109 Id. at 2847.
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Perhaps Justice Stevens recognized that explicitly adopting a “collective”
or “states’ right” approach to the Second Amendment outright might have
raised more troubling problems of its own, 110 or perhaps Stevens had some
conception of an individual right, not spelled out in his dissent, that would
resolve this tension, though it is difficult to imagine what that might be.
Nonetheless, we are left with a clear declaration that an individual right
exists, but with little discussion of what that existence means. In astronomy,
unseen planets are often identified by their gravitational effects. In Justice
Stevens’s dissent, it is the opposite: we can see the right clearly, it just
doesn’t seem to be affecting anything.
Justice Stevens’s opinion, to be fair, is mostly concerned with arguing
that the majority opinion is mistaken—a normal enough role for a dissent—
meaning that he spends far more time discussing what the Second
Amendment, in his opinion, does not do than what work, if any, it might
perform under his approach. Justice Breyer’s dissent, on the other hand, does
make some effort to develop a theory of individual rights protection under
the Second Amendment. Justice Breyer’s analysis would no doubt be more
influential had it appeared in a concurring opinion rather than in a dissent,
but it is nonetheless worthy of some attention.
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer agrees—and adds that the entire
Court agrees—that the Second Amendment protects an individual right of
some sort: “The Amendment protects an ‘individual’ right—i.e., one that is
separately possessed, and may be separately enforced, by each person on
whom it is conferred.” 111 But, says Justice Breyer, the Framers presumably
regarded the right as compatible with some kinds of gun regulation—of the
sort that existed at the time of the Framing—and thus, modern regulations of
a similar character would also withstand Second Amendment scrutiny. 112
Justice Breyer then surveys a number of colonial-era restrictions on
firearms—often, however, having to do with the discharge of guns rather
than their possession, or regulating the storage of gunpowder in quantity—
and concludes that the District of Columbia’s law, as intrusive as it was,
nonetheless did not violate the Second Amendment’s individual right.
According to Justice Breyer, the proper analysis should employ “an interest110 See Reynolds & Kates, supra note 11, at 1743 (“states’ right” interpretation
would allow state governments to nullify federal gun control laws in the exercise of state
militia powers).
111 128 S. Ct. at 2848 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (“To the contrary, colonial history itself offers important examples of the
kinds of gun regulation that citizens would then have thought compatible with the ‘right
to keep and bear arms’. . . . And those examples include substantial regulation of firearms
in urban areas, including regulations that imposed obstacles to the use of firearms for the
protection of the home.”).
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balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on
one side and the governmental public safety concerns on the other, the only
question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the
former in the course of advancing the latter.” 113 In other words, the Court
should ask “whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an
extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other
important governmental interests.” 114
Justice Breyer appears to be groping toward a sort of “undue burden”
standard for Second Amendment evaluation of firearms regulation, though it
might perhaps be more fair to characterize his approach as “undue burden
lite” since it seems doubtful that Justice Breyer’s approach would be
employed in the context of other individual rights. Justice Breyer would have
the Court defer to “a legislature’s empirical judgment in matters where a
legislature is likely to have greater expertise and greater institutional factfinding capacity,” rather than engaging in a “more rigid approach” in which
constitutional doctrine controls. 115
Justice Breyer then looks at various items of sociological data about
crime in urban areas and concludes that crime concerns outweigh such other
issues as self-defense, or ensuring a populace that is familiar with firearms.
Though the challenged statute made it illegal to practice or keep certain
firearms in the District of Columbia, Justice Breyer concludes that the
interests supporting the statute outweigh any burdens on gun owners,
requiring those interested in maintaining shooting skills to go elsewhere:
“The adjacent States do permit the use of handguns for target practice, and
those States are only a brief subway ride away.” 116
One wonders if Justice Breyer would regard a ban on abortions,
contraceptives, or pornography within the District as being similarly vitiated
by the availability of different legal regimes “only a brief subway ride away.”
And, indeed, a reading of Justice Breyer’s entire dissent suggests that the
balancing-of-interests that he proposes is one in which a judicial thumb is
firmly placed on one side of the scale:
The reason there is no clearly superior, less restrictive alternative to the
District’s handgun ban is that the ban’s very objective is to reduce
significantly the number of handguns in the District, say, for example, by
allowing a law enforcement officer immediately to assume that any

113 Id. at 2852.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2852–53.
116 Id. at 2862.
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handgun he sees is an illegal handgun. And there is no plausible way to
achieve that objective other than to ban the guns. 117

Comment [BPD2]: Why wouldn’t this be
“id. at 2864”?

It is an odd sort of constitutional right that can be defeated by arguments
that making the object of that right presumptively illegal is a reasonable
means of regulating the right in question. Yet that is the core of Justice
Breyer’s position. The result would seem to be an “individual right” to have
one’s firearms ownership balanced away by judges whenever that right might
inconvenience the authorities’ regulatory schemes. What sort of a right is
this?
Perhaps it is whimsy on our part, but if Justice Stevens’s formulation
resembles a beer commercial, then Justice Breyer’s “individual right” seems
reminiscent of the “right” of brother Stan (or sister “Loretta”) to have babies
in Monty Python’s Life of Brian:
STAN: I want to be a woman. From now on, I want you all to call me
'Loretta'.
REG: What?!
LORETTA: It's my right as a man.
JUDITH: Well, why do you want to be Loretta, Stan?
LORETTA: I want to have babies.
REG: You want to have babies?!
LORETTA: It's every man's right to have babies if he wants them.
REG: But... you can't have babies.
LORETTA: Don't you oppress me.
REG: I'm not oppressing you, Stan. You haven't got a womb! Where's the
foetus going to gestate?! You going to keep it in a box?!
LORETTA: [crying]
JUDITH: Here! I-- I've got an idea. Suppose you agree that he can't
actually have babies, not having a womb, which is nobody's fault, not even
the Romans', but that he can have the right to have babies.

117 128 S. Ct. at 2864.
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FRANCIS: Good idea, Judith. We shall fight the oppressors for your right
to have babies, brother. Sister. Sorry.
REG: What's the point?
FRANCIS: What?
REG: What's the point of fighting for his right to have babies when he can't
have babies?!
FRANCIS: It is symbolic of our struggle against oppression.
REG: Symbolic of his struggle against reality. 118

Likewise, under Justice Breyer’s formulation the Second Amendment
provides a right to have guns, even though—under the sort of regulation
Justice Breyer finds reasonable—citizens might not actually be able to have
guns. As an example of judicial cleverness, this might win points, but one
doubts that such an approach would win favor for straightforwardness among
members of the general public.
And, indeed, there is something oddly labored about both dissents. One
might have imagined a rejection of the individual right “Standard Model” of
the Second Amendment, 119 followed by a discussion that tracked the many
lower court opinions upholding gun control laws on those grounds. 120 Yet
even the dissenters apparently found the collective right approach
unpersuasive, requiring that the Second Amendment be construed in a
fashion that produced the same results in spite of an individual right mooring.
The result is a sort of “struggle against reality” that is Pythonesque in its
intricacy, if not its amusement value.
Such oddity suggests a political, rather than an analytical, basis. With
polls consistently indicating that very large majorities of Americans believe
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to arms, 121 and in
the face of a strongly worded majority opinion on the subject, the dissenters
presumably feared that taking a contrary, collective right position would

118 MONTY PYTHON’S LIFE OF BRIAN (Python (Monty) Pictures LTD 1979),
unofficial transcript available at http://www.mwscomp.com/movies/brian/brian-07.htm.
119 See Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L.
REV. 466–71 (1995) (describing the “Standard Model” individual right theory).
120 See generally Denning, supra note 87.
121 See Jones, supra note 6 (“A solid majority of the U.S. public, 73%, believes the
Second Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the rights of Americans to own
guns.”).
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diminish the political prestige of the Court, or at least of the dissenting
minority.
If the Heller minority is, in fact, trimming its rhetorical sails in the face
of popular sentiment, this would merely underscore the Supreme Court’s
character as a political, as well as legal, institution. It does, however, suggest
that such political sail-trimming does little to promote coherent or useful
legal analysis.

VII. CONCLUSION
In this brief Essay, we have offered five takes on what Heller might
mean, all subject to the notion (perhaps cynical, but certainly accurate) that it
will be future decisions by the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals that
will tell us what Heller really amounts to. One advantage of the “five takes”
approach is that it increases our chance of saying something that will turn out
to be true, allowing us to take credit while conveniently ignoring those other
“takes” that failed to materialize. But here is one further take that is sure to
be borne out: The response of lower courts to the Heller decision, and the
response of the Supreme Court to the lower courts, will tell us much about
the natures of those institutions, and the importance of Supreme Court
decisions to the actual operation of our legal system.
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